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The Milieu of Israeli Identity Politics: 
An Agent-Based Approach to Democratic Tribalism 
 
Abstract. This project provides an innovative theory and model for projecting 
Israeli domestic politics. In recent decades, a form of democratic tribalism based on 
distinct identity groups has come to define Israeli politics. Accordingly, our study 
focuses on the emergent behavior surrounding the formation of political coalitions 
and deriving from the interaction of Israeli identity groups and media-driven 
political issues. By fusing identity theory with computational agent-based modeling, 
the study sheds further light on the general role of identity groups, their 
demographic fluctuations, interaction with the media, interpassivity with other 
identity groups, and fixed political preferences, which make them distinct from the 
onset. In particular, the study employs computational simulations to project and 
show how demographic/cultural change in Israel over the next two decades will 
likely shift Israeli politics further to the right. 
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Since peace talks between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) began in 1993, many within the international community have held high 
expectations for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As nearly two decades 
have passed without the two sides reaching a final-status agreement, and after a drastic 
increase in violence over the last decade, the outlook for a resolution remains doubtful. 
Yet, with regard to negotiations, expectations still stand high. U.S. presidents, U.N. 
officials, and other leaders within the international community have consistently 
maintained an expectation that Israelis and Palestinians can “achieve” peace. Oftentimes, 
however, such leaders and officials neglect Palestinian and Israeli domestic politics, 
viewing each side as static, unchanging, and situated on some kind of progressive linear 
path toward a lasting peace resolution. 
 Contrary to such a perspective, domestic politics establishes the capabilities of 
respective Palestinian and Israeli leaders to negotiate with the other side. Since the 
democratic election of Hamas in 2006 and the deadly clashes that occurred in June of 
2007 between Hamas and Fatah, Palestinian political leadership has become increasingly 
fragmented with Hamas heading the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) in Gaza and Fatah 
claiming legitimacy to rule in the P.A. in the West Bank. Such fractures greatly affect the 
ability of Palestinian leaders to negotiate with Israel’s government. At a glance, the 
current nuances and foreseeable direction of Israeli politics looks even less clear, though it 
remains equally important for the potentiality of an eventual peace resolution. 
 A number of factors account for the shifts in Israeli politics. Israeli society has 
gone through a number of demographic changes in recent decades, which has affected the 
Jewish state’s domestic politics. Jews with different ethnic and cultural signifiers and 
levels of religiosity tend to hold different political views [15, 16]. As of 2002, the Israeli 
population was roughly 40 percent ethnically Ashkenazi (European) and 40 percent 
ethnically Mizrahi (African and Asian), with Arab-Muslims, Arab-Christians and Druze 
making up most of the remainder of the population. Yet, from 1990 to 2000 at least 
900,000 people immigrated to Israel from the former-Soviet Union (FSU) [9]. While 
ethnically Ashkenazi, Russian-speaking FSU Jews had a distinct cultural and ideological 
make-up that differentiated their political goals and viewpoints of Israel’s purpose and 
future [17]. Today, Israeli society views the Russians/FSU population as a “separate 
ethnic group in addition to Ashkenazim, Mizrahim, and Arabs [17].” In addition, the last 
few decades have seen the elevation of religious goals within traditional Mizrahi, 
Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox and national-Orthodox political outlooks. Already by the turn 
of the century in Israel, “there was growing concern over the widening divisions between 
different identity-based groups that lacked a core identity or unifying project [3].” Indeed, 
this trend has continued. Moreover, a form of “democratic tribalism,” wherein varying 
political preferences derived from ethnic, cultural and religious differences distinguish 
Israeli sub-groups, has come to define Israeli politics as a whole [1].  
Thus, by evaluating the politics of different Israeli identity groups, identifying 
their preferences and mobilization patterns, as well as demographic levels, one can paint a 
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fairly informative picture of domestic Israeli politics in the next couple decades. In an 
effort to project the political direction of domestic Israeli politics, this project seeks to 
build a conceptual model by replicating the political relationship between ethno-religious 
Israeli identity groups, the media, and government coalitions. Further, the project  
translates the conceptual model into a computational agent-based model, wherein it is 
possible to observe and test the emergent behavior1 that drives Israeli politics now and in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
2 Israeli Politics, Identity Groups, and Demographics 
 
In Israeli politics, “the Left” is consistently relative to where “the Right” is headed. The 
traditional leftist Israel party—Avodah (Labor)—has diminished in power as its affiliated 
“social group” has decreased in population. In the last Israeli election in 2009, Labor 
received just 9.93% of the vote, marking its worst electoral performance in Israel’s 62-
year history [18]. In the same election, the fairly new Kadima (Forward) party—made up 
of former right-wingers—presented itself as the new left-wing party, racking up 22.47% 
of the vote. Kadima, a party made up of former members of Israel mainstream right-wing 
party Likud (Consolidation) simply repositioned itself vis-à-vis the right and gained 
electoral success. 
Notably, every Israeli government since the Jewish state’s establishment in 1948 
has consisted of a coalition of parties. Minority electoral situations have forced the 
winning parties of Israeli elections to form coalition governments. Crombez contends that 
“in minority situations [i.e. where no single party has an absolute majority in the 
legislature], three types of government can be formed: minority governments, minimal 
winning coalitions and surplus majorities [7].” Regarding Israel, the latter two types mark 
the most common. Prior to 1977, the Israeli left formed surplus majorities. Since then, 
both the left and the right have formed minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities. 
Ultimately, Israeli coalitions situate either center-left or center-right, somewhere between 
a minimal winning coalition and an extensive surplus majority. 
 Accordingly, this project maintains a number of contentions/assumptions that 
stand in contrast to current literature of comparative politics. The theory and model resist 
the temptation to focus on parties as the primary mover of domestic politics. The project 
does not seek to fill the void of some party-theory lacunae. Rather, it combines innovative 
and developing theory with computational simulation, with the intent of trailblazing new 
foci and approaches for comparative politics and related fields. By sidelining the 
traditional party focus, the project jumps directly to the intersection of identity groups and 
coalitions, and the forces that bring the two together. Simply, it cuts out the political 
                                                
1 Emergent behavior “occurs when interactions among objects at one level give rise to different 
types of objects at another level. More precisely, a phenomenon is emergent if it requires new 
categories to describe it which are not required to describe the [behavior] of the underlying 
components [11].” 
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middleman, and contends that dominant identity groups matter more than dominant 
parties. 
Up to the 1977 election, when the second of two main ethnic groups began 
mobilizing and utilizing their voting power, Israel had consecutive left-wing coalition 
governments. Since the 1977 elections, Israeli politics “has been polarized into two 
[general] political camps… This division into two political camps is ethnically marked 
and reinforced [16].” Simply, most Ashkenazim back the left, and most Mizrahim support 
the right [16]. The Israeli political right “officially stands for Greater Israel, negotiates 
toughly before making territorial concessions in exchange for peace, protects Jewish 
interests more than universal rights, and treats religion favorably [16].” The Israeli 
political left seeks “the partition of Eretz Israel in order to keep Israel Jewish, the defense 
of general values, and the restriction of the role of religion in public life [16].” Essentially, 
both the left and the right pursue the maintenance of the Zionist nature of Israel, yet the 
left tends to promote universal democratic values, whereas the right favors Israel’s Jewish 
population. 
And while a simple left-right division holds today, the Israeli political 
environment has become more complicated. As Israel’s Jewish population has become 
more diverse so has the collective citizenry’s understanding of Israel’s purpose. The 
Israeli government classifies Israeli citizens under only three categories: Jewish, Arab, 
and other. In reality, however, the small Middle Eastern country of 7.5 million citizens 
remains culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse, as well as ideologically divergent in 
a number of cases. Over the last thirty years the country has witnessed drastic change 
involving a range of identity groups that rank ethnicity, religion, and/or ideology with 
varying degrees and perspectives. These differences come to light in preferential treatment 
of Israeli identity’s core components: Zionism (Jewish nationalism), democratic values, 
and Judaism—along with an increasingly important role of distinct group interests [3]. 
 Today, Israel’s seven main identity groups stand diverse and divergent on a 
number of levels. These groups include the secular Ashkenazim, traditional and religious 
Mizrahim, Russian/FSU-Israelis, national and ultra-Orthodox, and Arab-Israelis (Muslim, 
Christian and Druze). Israel’s citizenry contains a variety of other distinct identity groups, 
such as Ethiopians, Circassians, and Black Hebrews, though their contribution to Israeli 
identity politics has and will likely continue to be minimal due to their low numbers and 
marginal structural power. 
 
2.1 Identity Groups’ Preferences   
 
In Hebrew, the word Ashkenazim literally stands for “German Jews,” though typically 
signifies all Jews of European descent.2 Secular-Ashkenazim founded the state of Israel. 
Acosta notes: “Israel’s Ashkenazi elite boast many achievements. They (re)constructed a 
nation from scores of diasporic communities, revived a lifeless language, and 
(re)established the Jewish state in the Middle East amid the heart of the Islamic world. 
                                                
2 Ashkenazi marks the singular form of the word. 
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Within a few decades, they groomed the Southern California-sized country into an 
economic and military regional power. But despite their many achievements, the 
Ashkenazi elite have had their day atop Israel’s ethno-cultural hierarchy [2].” Though 
their previously hegemonic power has diminished, the Secular-Ashkenazim still 
collectively form the basis of the Israeli political left. Kimmerling recognizes that “secular 
Jews of Ashkenazi origin…tend to be left wing, support territorial concessions, and have a 
compromising political attitude toward the conflict [with the Palestinians]; they are 
considered as structuring a civic and universalistic social order [10].” At around 20 
percent of the total Israeli citizenry and maintaining replacement fertility rates, secular-
Ashkenazim represent the guardians of Israel’s democratic institutions and mark the chief 
subscribers to Western political values and goals [5, 8, 13, 15, 17]. 
 In Hebrew, the word Mizrahim literally stands for “Easterners,” though typically 
signifies Jews of Middle Eastern, North African, Central and South Asian descent; and, 
the word has come to incorporate Sephardi Jews or Jews originating from the Iberian 
Peninsula.3 The late 1970s and 1980s marked the maturing of the Secular-Mizrahim as a 
social and political force in Israel. Today, Secular-Mizrahim make up almost 30 percent 
of the total Israeli citizenry [8]. Collectively, the “Mizrahim constitute the backbone of 
right-wing politics in Israel [17].” Treated poorly by the ruling Ashkenazi elite upon 
arrival to Israel, a “sense of trauma and injustice can account for the rejection that most 
Mizrahim feel toward the left [16].” 
 Like their less religious co-ethnics, the Religious-Mizrahim hold right-wing 
political stances [10]. Yet, unlike the Secular-Mizrahim, they focus more on intra-group 
interests as they tend to be poorer and have lower degrees of education. Both groups of 
Mizrahim remain more “traditional” than either secular or religious, yet the poorer of the 
two segments focuses on religious Sephardi identity as a means of upward social mobility 
[17]. The Religious-Mizrahim make up around 7 to 8 percent of the total Israeli citizenry 
[15]. 
 As of 2006, the Russian/FSU population of Israel remained above 14 percent of 
the total Israeli citizenry.4 Secular-Russians hold many similarities to the Secular-
Ashkenazim, though with some key distinguishing factors. Smooha contends: “Although 
Russian immigrants came from the post-communist bloc, they were strongly oriented to 
the West and many saw themselves as Westerners. They shared with the [secular-
Ashkenazim] cultural patterns such as the Protestant work ethic, secularism, the 
importance of investment in education and in children, and low fertility, but differed from 
them in other areas such as respect for the rule of law and democratic values [17].” 
Ultimately, Russian-Israelis view their “Russianness” as the primary component of their 
collective identity [4]. In the past, Russian/FSU parties have participated in government 
coalitions with both the left-wing and right-wing blocks, but recently have veered to the 
right, as exemplified by the politics of Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman. 
 
                                                
3 Mizrahi represents the singular form of the word. 
4 Calculated from [17] 
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 Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazim remain at the margins of Israel society, yet maintain 
a fairly engaged political consciousness. Friedlander notes: “[the ultra-Orthodox represent 
a] contra-acculturation group, which favor[s] turning away from the contemporary way of 
life in order to preserve traditional ways…Israel’s ultra-orthodox group ‘strives to 
separate itself not only from every aspect of the outside world culture, but also from 
people or things that, having passed near or through that world, carried contaminating 
elements of it [8].’” Today, the ultra-Orthodox mark about 4 to 6 percent of the total 
Israeli citizenry [15]. 
 Unlike the ultra-Orthodox, national-Orthodox Ashkenazim engage Israeli society 
and politics openly and as full-fledged Zionists. Friedlander summarizes: “[they represent 
an] acculturation group [that favors] the promotion of cultural contact with the outer 
world, while retaining Jewish culture and beliefs [8].” Also in contrast to the ultra-
Orthodox, the national-Orthodox stand firm on right-wing Zionist issues and focus less on 
intra-group interests. 
 By 2009, the Arab population numbered at 1.488 million people, representing 20 
percent of the total Israeli citizenry [6]. Standing today at one-fifth the total Israeli 
citizenry, the Arab Muslim, Christian and Druze populations represent a symbolic threat 
to the longevity of Israel as a Jewish state. Arab-Israelis accordingly play the role of the 
eternal outsider within Israeli citizenry. This shapes their political and ideological 
outlooks. While Druze have largely integrated into the Zionist social and political 
framework [12], Arab-Muslims and Arab-Christians overtly challenge the Zionist 
character of Israel [1]. 
 
2.2 Population and Demographic Projections 
 
In summation, the current demographic make up of Israeli citizens follows: secular and 
traditional Ashkenazim are around 20 percent, secular and traditional Mizrahim represent 
about 29 percent, Russians and other citizens from the former-Soviet Union make up 
around 14 percent, Orthodox, religious and more traditional Mizrahim mark about 7 
percent, ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazim comprise around 5 percent, national-Orthodox 
Ashkenazim make up roughly 4 percent, and Arab-Israelis of varying religious 
backgrounds stand at a solid 20 percent of the total Israeli citizenry of 7.5 million people. 
 Demographic change in the future rests largely on fertility/birth rates and 
percentage of birthing-age women, and each Israeli identity group has their own set of 
factors. By 2030, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics expects the Arab-Muslim, Christian 
and Druze population to stand above 2.3 million people, marking around 24 percent of the 
total Israeli citizenry [6]. This in part to the high fertility rates of the respective Arab-
Israeli groups: Arab-Muslims and Druze stand at 4.0 children per woman, which nearly 
doubles the replacement rate, and Arab-Christians remain at 2.4 children per woman [8]. 
The Secular-Ashkenazim and Secular-Russians maintain replacement birthrate levels [8]. 
Mizrahim maintain a 2.2 fertility rate. Ultra-Orthodox and national-Orthodox maintain 





Thus, how will demographic/cultural change affect Israeli politics in the next two 
decades? An answer to this question can provide insight into the likely increase or 
decrease of support among Israelis for or against peace negotiations in the foreseeable 
future. The model seeks to answer this question generally by determining shifts from the 
current state of Israeli politics. 
 We hold a number of theoretical assumptions. First, Israeli identity groups divide 
along the lines of ethno-religious, cultural, and ideological cleavages. Second, regarding 
the formation of governments, identity groups matter more than parties. Third, each 
identity group maintains a varying set of political preferences and spends a varying degree 
of its potential political capital. Fourth, dominant issues in the media play a key role in 
prompting identity groups to divide and spend their political capital.  
 The interaction of these assumptions comes to life in a unique environment 
wherein a form of democratic tribalism functions around ethno-religious divides and in 
response to the contradictory sources of Israeli national identity, i.e. Zionism (Z), 
democracy (D), and Judaism (J). These sources, with the addition of intra-group (G) 
concerns, comprise the basis of an identity groups’ hierarchal political preferences. 
Further, dominant issues in the media focus on topics related to Zionism (e.g. national 
security, the durability of Israel’s Jewish majority, etc.), democracy (political participation 
of non-Jews, universal values, peace negotiations, etc.), Judaism (e.g. laws governing the 
Sabbath, the sanctity of holy places, etc.) and intra-group interests (e.g. pension insurance, 
military draft deferments, etc.). The interaction of such issues with identity groups 




With the well-entrenched political preferences of identity groups, and with regard to 
current demographic numbers, it is likely that demographic/cultural change will continue 
to push Israeli politics to the right for the foreseeable future. The project seeks to test this 
hypothesis with coalitions marking the dependent variable, and identity groups and issues 
in the media representing the independent variables. 
 
4 Converting the Conceptual Model into a Computational Model  
 
Getting the conceptual model right is imperative to generating meaningful results. 
However, in the context of agent-based modeling, modelers must also take great care 
when translating the conceptual model into a computational model in order to maintain 
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the validity and reliability of the model.5 In computational agent-based modeling, 
modelers use a computer simulation program to conduct virtual experiments, iterated 
repetitively for the purpose of obtaining reliable results.6  
 The project utilizes NetLogo version 4.1.1 to implement the conversion from the 
conceptual to the computational.7 It employs the programming language Logo. The 
program environment has a number of qualities beneficial to our project. A simple 
graphical user interface (GUI) visually represents the model. A black rectangle visually 
represents the world of the agents whose interactions come under observation. Using 
sliders we created agents, known as turtles in NetLogo. One can adjust the value on each 
slider, allowing the researcher to run and test the model with a variety of different inputs.  
 For the computational model, we created a total of eleven different types of 
agents as distinct breeds in NetLogo. Accordingly, we created a total of eleven 
corresponding sliders. The first seven breeds represent the agents of the seven main ethno-
religious identity groups residing in Israel, including “Secular Ashkenazis,” “Secular 
Mizrahis,” “Secular Russians,” “Religious Mizrahis,” “Ultra-Orthodox (Ashkenazis),” 
“National-Orthodox (Ashkenazis),” and “Arab (Muslims, Druze, and Christians).” The 
last four breeds represent the different categories of issues that typically appear in the 
Israeli media, including DEMOCRACY, ZIONISM, JUDAISM and INTRA-GROUP issues. 
We assigned a fixed amount of political capital for each ethno-religious identity group 
breed to spend for each of the four different issue categories.  
 
4.1 Representing Theory in Our Model 
 
The model simulates the political interaction of identity groups and media issues, and 
concludes with the formation of a coalition type of either center-left or center-right. When 
the model is setup, agents in each identity group and issue category are created in 
quantities set by the researcher on the corresponding sliders. When the model runs, the 
issues move around in the NetLogo world, impacting neighboring agents belonging to 
different ethno-religious identity groups. During run-time, for each iteration,8 the number 
of each category of immediate issue neighbors within the eight patches surrounding an 
agent from a distinct breed representing a person from a specific ethno-religious group is 
counted. A running count of these issue neighbors for each agent representing a person is 
updated in each iteration, also known as a tick in NetLogo. In each iteration, this running 
                                                
5 “A measure is reliable to the extent that it gives the same result again and again if the measurement 
is repeated.” Additionally, a “measure is valid if it actually measure what it purports to measure 
[14].”  
6 Importantly, we have tested the validity and reliability of the computational model as an accurate 
representation of the conceptual model, as well as the validity and reliability of the conceptual 
model as an accurate representation of reality. We achieved confirmation by comparing the data 
obtained from the computational model with real-world data for all 18 of Israel’s elections. 
7 To view the code, see NetLogo Models Library. 
8 Each iteration marks one calendar day. The program runs for 1232 days, representing the average 
number of days between Israeli elections. 
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count of issue neighbors for every person agent present in the NetLogo world is used to 
compute the total political capital spent by members of each ethno-religious group for 
each issue category in each iteration. 
 In the model, coalition formation revolves around the outcome of political capital 
spent on the varying issues. Two issues—DEMOCRACY and ZIONISM—hold positive or 
coalition forming capabilities. The other two represent negative issues that simply take 
away potential political capital from either of the two coalition-forming issues. If the total 
political capital computed for DEMOCRACY issues comes out greater than for ZIONISM 
issues, then the model projects the formation of a center-left coalition. Inversely, if the 
total political capital computed for ZIONISM issues reach higher levels than for 
DEMOCRACY issues, then the model projects the formation of a center-right coalition.  
The idea that preferences are fixed and not influenced by other agents is unique 
to our model and ensures a distinction from previous forecasting work on decision-
making. Because our agent’s interactions are limited there is also no recourse to game 
theoretic principals. As such, our model journeys beyond the current norms of most 
predictive political models. The effect of the agenda setting mechanism can have 
interesting effects. For example, if a ZIONISM rather than DEMOCRACY issue prompts a 
Secular-Ashkenazi agent, its six political capital points will be in effect wasted and its 
(slight) support will instead fall behind a center-right coalition formed by a majority of 
ZIONISM votes. Unlike other models that assume constant actions by agents, this model 
takes into account variant levels of mobilization due to dynamic political considerations. 
 
4.2 Hardcoding the Preferences of Identity Groups 
 
In the model, preferences and mobilization are linked. Issues in the media function as the 
ignition. But preferences are hardcoded in the form of potential political capital points 
spent on the four issue categories. The coding allots each identity group ten political 
capital points divided among four general political preferences: ZIONISM (Z), 
DEMOCRACY (D), JUDAISM (J) and INTRA-GROUP (G).9 
 The hardcoding of preferences has a number of implications. It suggests that the 
ability of identity groups to influence other identity groups is limited. Effects of one group 
on another are negative or interpassive rather than positive or interactive. Groups do not 
directly convince other groups to change their belief patterns but rather the prompting of a 
group’s agent by an issue agent slightly detracts from the possibility of other agents from 
other groups interacting with that issue. The hardcoding of identity group’s political 
preferences reflects the subscriptions to various values and beliefs that form distinct social 
groupings from the onset. 
 
                                                
9 Z, D, J, and D refer generally to all political concerns. They foremost represent values rather than 
direct ideological signifiers. For justification for the hardcoding of preferences, see the section 
above entitled “Israeli Politics, Identity Groups and Demographics.” See the model for the specific 




With our model, we replicated all 18 of Israel’s elections (from 1949 to 2009) with 
varying degrees of success.10 The difference between coalition victories in actual and 
simulated elections ranged from zero to 13 percent, with an average margin of error of 





Figure 1  
 
 In each simulation, the model selected the winning coalition type (either center-
left or center-right) that received the actual historical mandate, with the exception of the 
1984 election. However, the 1984 election marks one of three Israeli elections wherein the 
government brought together the two main political camps to form a “national unity” 
government. Our model presented a center-left coalition receiving 50 percent of the vote; 
while the percentage and coalition type was off, this finding symbolizes the split mandate 
in 1984 that ultimately led to a national-unity government.  
 
5 Forecasts, General Findings and Further Research 
 
After replicating all previous Israeli elections and running a variety of sensitivity analyses, 
we ran tests projecting Israeli elections in the next two decades. Utilizing demographic 
projections, we forecast Israeli politics for 2020 and 2030 respectively. We tested the 
demographic changes in conjunction with a variety of political media scenarios. See our 
findings and parameter settings in Figure 2. 
 
                                                






 The findings reinforce our hypothesis that it is likely that demographic/cultural 
change will continue to push Israeli politics to the right for the foreseeable future. There 
are a number of interesting nuances within the tests. In 2020, the Israeli left remains 
politically viable so long as DEMOCRACY issues are dominant in the media, or if INTRA-
GROUP interests become more important than issues concerning Israel’s Zionist character 
or democratic nature. Other than those two instances, the Israeli right likely maintains, if 
not slightly increases, its current political advantage vis-à-vis the Israeli left. In 2030, the 
Israeli right solidifies its dominance. In each set of issue circumstances, the Israeli right 
increases its electoral advantage. In the one circumstance where a center-left coalition 
forms the government, it does so with a nine percent drop from a decade prior. In cases 
where issues of ZIONISM represent at least 30 percent of the issues in the media, the 
Israeli right wins elections with at least 72 percent of the total vote. With the wide variety 
of issue scenarios, demographic change accounts for the slight shift to the right in 2020, 
and a further shift to the right by 2030. 
 In addition to the particular findings on Israeli politics, the model suggests a 
number of general findings. As the emergent behavior deriving from the interaction of 
identity groups and political issues drives the formation of political coalitions, it is 
possible in research to cutout the middleman of coalition or electoral politics—namely, 
political parties. As a result, the findings shed further light on the importance of identity 
groups, their demographic fluctuations, interaction with the media, interpassivity with 
other identity groups, and fixed political preferences, which make them distinct from the 
onset.  
 Further research within this developing theoretical framework—made possible 
by computational agent-based modeling—should focus on the components of a political 
environment and how they function together interactively and interpassively to comprise a 
‘sum that is greater than the individual parts.’ Our model offers a unique design for 
studying coalition formation in democratic states that have a complementary nation 
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housing numerous distinct identity groups. Effectively, researchers could use its 
framework for, and in extensions to, other political environments. Coalition formation 
marks only one of a limitless variety of currently opaque socio-political phenomena that 
the combination of identity theory and computational agent-based modeling can help 
illuminate. 
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